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Abstract 
 
Whilst we agree with much of what Ramon, Bobak and White (2019) say, we 
emphasise the additional importance of taking into account the often-neglected 
psychometric properties of existing and future techniques.  
 
Commentary 
 
We agree with much of Ramon, Bobak and White's (2019) perspective on super-
recognisers. Especially, their endorsement of the importance of the lab to world 
synergy, in which practical questions act as strong tests of theory and theories are in 
turn refined to cope with practical questions. This approach belongs in a time-
honoured tradition (Baddeley, 2018) that has been fundamental to much work on face 
recognition (Davies & Young, 2017). We agree too that understanding the nature of 
laboratory and real-world tasks is crucial, as it is in almost any area of face perception 
research (Young, 2018). 
 
More specifically, we acknowledge that many of us have been slow to appreciate the 
importance of individual differences, despite notable exceptions highlighting what 
might be learnt from combining individual differences and experimental approaches 
(e.g. Cronbach,1957). The existence of a wide range of face recognition ability in the 
population also has substantial implications for widely-used theoretical ideas, such as 
face expertise (Young & Burton, 2018). 
 
We wonder, though, in what sense super-recognisers have been "discovered"? Is 
what they do somehow qualitatively different from what most of us can manage, or is it 
just a convenient way to describe the top end of a continuum of ability? The latter 
seems to us at present more likely and carries the interesting implication that 
developmental prosopagnosia may simply represent the opposite extreme, rather than 
a distinct pathology (Noyes, Phillips & O'Toole, 2017). If this is correct, it seems more 
accurate to say that super-recognisers have been given a potentially useful label than 
that they have been discovered. 
 
Such issues are critical to Ramon et al.'s claim that super-recognisers can "offer clues 
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to the underlying processes responsible for high levels of face processing ability". This 
might well be the case if super-recognisers are actually doing something different from 
what most of us do when we look at faces. But we don't think that conclusion is 
warranted from current evidence. Instead, we agree with Ramon et al. that there is at 
present "insufficient understanding of the functional basis of superior face processing 
skills". 
 
Why do we know so little? Apart from the obvious newness of the field itself, Ramon et 
al. emphasise the lack of agreed criteria to define super-recognisers (cf. Noyes et al., 
2017). In their view this is especially important because even putative super-
recognisers' levels of performance can vary across different tests. Whilst this may 
indeed be the case, our opinion is that there is at present room for doubt about how to 
interpret these between-test differences. Instead, more attention must be paid to the 
psychometric properties of the tests themselves to interpret variability in performance. 
One important aspect of these psychometric properties that Ramon et al. rightly 
emphasise is whether a test can discriminate levels of performance across the full 
range of ability. But equally important are issues of test reliability (Mollon, Bosten, 
Peterzell & Webster, 2017).  
 
In essence, any test score is an estimate that involves some mix of the person's 'true' 
ability and a component usually considered as 'error' that results from variability 
created through the participant's level of engagement, their lucky or unlucky guesses, 
and so on. This error involves partly random factors that can influence the score 
achieved in an upward or downward direction from the underlying ability. 
 
Suppose, then, that there are no real differences in the type of ability evinced by 
people who are very good at face recognition. If we give a particular test of face 
recognition to a population and define super-recognisers as those individuals who 
achieve scores better than a given criterion, the putative super-recognisers we identify 
will actually be a mixture of what we might think of as genuine super-recognisers and 
others for whom any upward effect of random error was sufficient to nudge them 
above the criterion we set. Moreover, there may also be some less fortunate super-
recognisers who we failed to identify because random error took them below our 
criterion. It follows that if we then give a second, different test of face recognition to the 
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same population, a somewhat different subgrouping of individuals may well emerge as 
meeting the criterion to count as super-recognisers, but it is simply error variance that 
lies behind these apparent dissociations. 
 
In other words, differences in performance that result from measurement error and 
related factors are to be expected even when different tests are actually trying to 
measure the same underlying factor. This means that the psychometric properties of 
the tests themselves and the consequent base rates for these essentially meaningless 
differences need to be borne in mind before concluding that differences in test 
performance reflect genuine differences between super-recognisers. Such problems 
can in principle be addressed; they should not be ignored. 
 
With these points in mind, we agree with Ramon et al. that accreditation of super-
recognisers is likely premature and may be problematic. But if super-recognisers are 
indeed at the top end of the distribution of ability, we think it makes sense to place 
them in jobs that match their skill. Even if they turn out to offer benefits that fall in the 
relatively modest range estimated by Ramon et al., these are likely useful given the 
numbers of occasions for which they may be invoked. Ramon et al. point out that 
"selection alone clearly cannot solve the problem of high error rates", but concede that 
it "can support the development of strategies aiming to improve facial identity 
processing in applied settings". Their point is that the criteria used to define a super-
recogniser may depend on the demands of the real-world job. Specifically, the error 
rate that is acceptable in one situation may be different from another, and the task that 
the super-recogniser will need to perform may also be critical if super-recognisers do 
turn out to differ from each other (Noyes, Hill & O'Toole, 2018). Whilst we have given 
reasons to question whether existing evidence does point unequivocally to different 
types of super-recognisers, this is clearly an open and fundamental question. 
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